Ukraine Brand Report

Context — the paradox of Ukraine's brand

Ukraine has travelled a long road: from a Soviet republic, through the difficult 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, through the Revolution of Dignity (2013–2014) and the annexation of Crimea, to Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. In parallel, in the shadow of successive crises, the country built real foundations of a modern economy: an IT services sector, a digital state administration, and — since 2022 — one of the fastest-growing drone and defence-technology sectors of recent years.

On 23 June 2022, the European Council unanimously granted Ukraine EU candidate status — a decision taken at a pace rarely seen in EU practice, given that the application had been filed only a few months earlier, under an ongoing invasion. The accession process has moved forward clearly since then: on 15 June 2026, the European Union and Ukraine opened the first negotiating cluster, "Fundamentals," covering, among other things, the rule of law, fundamental rights, the functioning of democratic institutions, public-administration reform and economic criteria. This is still an early stage of a multi-year negotiation, not guaranteed membership — but a real, verifiable step forward rather than only a political declaration.

Even so, the paradox remains: these achievements are almost invisible in global awareness next to the image of war. When someone abroad hears the word "Ukraine," the first associations are conflict, destruction, refugees, aid — rarely innovation, technology, agriculture or culture. Ukraine today has unprecedented global visibility, but limited control over what that visibility is associated with.

Why this matters

Nation branding is not, for Ukraine, a matter of image cosmetics — it directly affects real economic and geopolitical decisions.

Reconstruction and foreign investment

Postwar reconstruction will require the trust of private investors, not only government and multilateral aid funds. A country seen as a "war zone" attracts capital differently than a country seen as an emerging market with a clear path to the EU.

Diversifying the aid narrative

In a prolonged conflict, a narrative built solely on compassion and humanitarian aid carries a risk of gradually losing traction in the media and in donor public opinion. Ukraine's fall in the Nation Brands Index between 2022 and 2023, despite continued global sympathy, may point to that kind of risk, though it does not confirm it on its own.

The wartime diaspora

Millions of Ukrainians displaced by the war are potential human and financial capital for reconstruction — provided the country can offer a credible vision of the future, not only images of destruction.

Exporting technology and innovation

Ukraine's IT sector and its drone and defence-technology industry have earned real industry recognition worldwide: drone production grew from a few thousand units in 2022 to roughly 4 million in 2025, and the large majority of unmanned equipment purchased today for Ukraine's Defence Forces is domestically produced. This is a ready-made foundation for a brand built on innovation and technology, currently communicated mainly to a narrow circle of specialists.

Diplomacy and soft power

A positive national image can influence the political, economic and social environment in which talks on European integration, investment and international support take place.

Branding legacy: "Ukraine NOW" (2018)

Ukraine's image problem did not begin in 2022. On 10 May 2018, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the official country brand "Ukraine NOW," developed by the Banda agency in cooperation with UkraineInvest. Research conducted for the occasion found that Ukraine was associated above all with corruption, revolution and armed conflict. The "Ukraine NOW" brand won the 2018 Red Dot Design Award in the Corporate Identity category. The war changed global perceptions of Ukraine, but it did not remove the oldest, structural problem: the lack of a coherent economic narrative independent of the news cycle.

Ukraine's real strengths

Resilience and adaptive capacity

Ukrainians' ability to keep the economy, public administration and private sector running under wartime conditions shows a high capacity for adaptation on the part of both the state and society. In several areas — digitalisation, defence production — the response to crisis has accelerated development rather than stopping it. The risk is nonetheless real: an image built solely on suffering and heroism evokes sympathy rather than the admiration and desire to invest that an economic brand needs.

Solidarity and a culture of volunteering

The scale of grassroots mobilisation since 2022 — territorial defence, volunteer supply networks for the army, fundraising for drones and medical equipment, spontaneous help for internally displaced people — is one of the most authentic elements of contemporary Ukrainian collective identity. This grassroots civic agency, rather than suffering alone, is probably a stronger foundation for the brand than the war narrative by itself.

Diia — a digital state that works

Diia is Ukraine's digital-administration system, and in practice it shows what an effective digital state can look like. According to data from Ukraine's Ministry of Digital Transformation for 2026, the Diia app has more than 24 million users and provides 33 digital documents (including a national ID, biometric passport and driving licence), while the Diia portal has more than 7.5 million users and over 190 online services, from starting a business to fully online official procedures. During the war, the system was expanded to include, among other things, reporting destroyed property (the eVidnovlennia programme). Diia is today also a reference point in discussions about exporting Ukrainian digital solutions to other countries.

The drone industry

Ukraine's drone industry has grown at a very fast, wartime pace: from a few thousand units in 2022 to around 4 million produced in 2025, according to Ukraine's Ministry of Defence. The production target for 2026 exceeds 7 million units. According to data from the Defence Procurement Agency (DOT), around 95% of drones currently purchased for Ukraine's Defence Forces are domestically produced. The competencies built up in drone production, autonomous systems and military software have direct civilian (dual-use) applications — in logistics, precision agriculture and infrastructure monitoring — giving a real foundation for a postwar brand as an exporter of dual-use technology.

Agriculture — Ukraine as a key player in global agriculture

Despite the war, Ukraine remains a significant player in global agriculture. According to FAO data for 2024, the country accounted for around 9% of world wheat exports, 14% of corn exports and 46% of sunflower-oil exports. In the three seasons immediately before the full-scale invasion, these shares were even higher — roughly 10% of wheat exports, 15% of corn, and about half of world sunflower-oil exports, with annual grain exports exceeding 60 million tonnes. This advantage is communicated almost exclusively in a crisis context (port blockades, grain corridors), rarely as a brand of quality and origin.

The younger generation and the IT sector

Ukraine's IT sector developed over two decades from niche outsourcing into one of the country's most important service-export sectors. A record was set in 2022 — $7.3 billion in exports, even in the first year of the full-scale war. In 2025, IT service exports reached around $6.6 billion, and in the first half of 2026 computer-services exports reached $3.343 billion — up 4.1% year-on-year compared with the first half of 2025 (data from the IT Ukraine Association, based on National Bank of Ukraine figures). The industry is clearly moving from pure outsourcing towards building its own products and technology brands.

Culture and sport as soft power

Ukraine has three Eurovision wins to its name: Ruslana (2004), Jamala (2016, "1944," about the deportation of Crimean Tatars) and Kalush Orchestra (2022, in the first months of the full-scale war) — each a genuine moment of global media attention in its own right. In sport, the brothers Vitali and Wladimir Klitschko, and today Oleksandr Usyk, have long been globally recognised names associated with Ukraine. These are real but scattered successes, treated more as separate "moments of glory" than as parts of one coherent brand narrative built on courage, creativity and persistence.

History and identity

The patterns of perception described later in this report did not come from nowhere — they have precisely dated roots in a policy of systematically suppressing Ukrainian linguistic and cultural identity, pursued by successive empires since the 19th century, interwoven with moments of mass civic mobilisation.

• 1876The Ems Ukaz — a ban on printing in Ukrainian
• Holodomorvictims numbered in the millions (1932–1933) — the exact figure remains a subject of research
• 1986the Chornobyl disaster
• 14,200–14,400killed in Donbas in total, 2014–2021, including at least 3,404 civilians (UN OHCHR)

The Valuev Circular (1863) and the Ems Ukaz (1876)

The Russian Empire ran one of the most systematic legal campaigns in Europe to suppress a language. Interior Minister Pyotr Valuev's 1863 circular banned the printing of Ukrainian-language religious and educational literature, invoking the Kyiv censorship committee's claim that "a separate Little Russian language never existed, does not exist, and cannot exist." Thirteen years later, the Ems Ukaz (1876) went further, banning the import of Ukrainian books, the creation of original works, translations, the printing of sheet music and the staging of plays in the language.

The Holodomor (1932–1933)

A politically engineered famine under Stalin, at its peak in June 1933, claimed thousands of victims a day. The exact death toll remains a subject of research and methodological debate. One widely cited demographic study puts direct population losses in the Ukrainian SSR at around 3.9 million, while higher estimates also exist. More than thirty countries formally recognise the Holodomor as genocide against the Ukrainian nation, although some historians still debate the legal question of intent.

Chornobyl (26 April 1986)

The worst nuclear disaster in history remained for decades one of the most recognisable foreign associations with Ukraine as the site of a nuclear catastrophe. That association became strongly present again in global popular culture after the 2019 HBO miniseries "Chernobyl," even though it depicts events from several decades earlier.

The Orange Revolution (2004) and the Revolution of Dignity (2013–2014)

The second round of the November 2004 presidential election was marred by serious irregularities and failed to meet many international democratic standards. The Supreme Court annulled the result and ordered the second round to be repeated. The mass, peaceful protests that accompanied this, and Viktor Yushchenko's victory in the re-run, became one of the most important modern examples of civic mobilisation in Ukraine. A decade later, the Euromaidan (2013–2014) repeated this pattern on a larger scale, leading to a change of government and then, shortly after, to the annexation of Crimea and war in Donbas. According to UN OHCHR data, the conflict in Donbas killed a total of between 14,200 and 14,400 people between 14 April 2014 and 31 December 2021, including at least 3,404 civilians — even before the world "noticed" Ukraine in 2022.

The legacy of being seen as a periphery

For decades, Ukraine was portrayed from outside — and, in part, came to see itself — as a periphery: first of the USSR, then of Russia's sphere of influence, later as "a country on its way to Europe." This external narrative left behind a communication challenge that has outlasted the geopolitics behind it: Ukraine is still often treated as a partner that must endlessly prove its place in Europe, rather than a partner that already belongs to it.

Added to this is a history of corruption and the capture of parts of the state by oligarchic interests after 1991, as well as recurring political crises — all of which built deep public distrust of institutions, making it harder to pursue a single, coherent, top-down brand strategy: any such initiative is easily read as political or self-interested. Alongside "Ukraine fatigue" abroad, it is also worth reckoning with the risk of social exhaustion inside the country after years of war, losses, mobilisation and uncertainty — a risk that could, over time, weaken precisely the resources (solidarity, grassroots mobilisation) that are today the brand's strongest asset.

Cossack resourcefulness

The ability to find non-standard solutions under severe resource constraints — from civilian FPV-drone production in garages and basements to volunteer logistics operating outside formal structures — is often linked in Ukrainian culture to the Cossack tradition: self-organisation and resistance to outside domination. This is a cultural interpretation, not a proven causal link. The underlying pattern of behaviour — self-organisation, improvisation and the ability to act with limited resources — is nonetheless visible in contemporary Ukraine, and may serve as one element of a narrative about resilience and adaptive capacity.

Possible archetypes in the narrative of contemporary Ukraine

The examples below are an interpretive frame useful for analysing communication and identity, not a closed or universally recognised catalogue of archetypes.

The Cossack — an archetype of freedom, resistance to external subjugation and independence, rooted historically in the tradition of the Zaporizhian Sich, today strongly reactivated by the war as a symbol of readiness to defend independence.

Berehynia — an archetype of the protective, strong woman guarding hearth and community, deeply rooted in folk culture, today visible in women's roles in civil defence, volunteering and keeping society functioning during the war.

The volunteer / IT specialist — a new, growing generational archetype combining technical skills with civic commitment: soldier-volunteer, programmer and volunteer at once, depending on what the moment calls for.

Risks and challenges

The narrative trap

Analyses of collective memory and social communication point to the risk that societies associated for a long time mainly with war, disaster or suffering may be perceived by external audiences chiefly through the lens of those experiences. The risk for Ukraine is that if the global narrative remains dominated by suffering and loss, it may reinforce sympathy more than associations with innovation, entrepreneurship or investment appeal.

Corruption and institutional perception

Despite real reforms after 2014 and further ones after 2022 (some tied to EU accession requirements), Ukraine still faces a historically entrenched international perception as a country of corruption — exactly the same association identified back in the 2018 research behind the "Ukraine NOW" brand. The opening of the "Fundamentals" negotiating cluster in June 2026 puts the rule of law and institutional reform squarely at the centre of the accession process, but does not by itself determine its outcome. Perceptions of corruption have a direct impact on investment decisions and remain a constant topic in EU accession talks.

Geopolitical uncertainty

As long as the course and end of the war remain unclear, long-term brand planning is difficult — investors and partners operate on a risk-management logic rather than an aspirational one.

"Ukraine fatigue" abroad

Long conflicts tend to gradually fall out of media and donor priorities. Ukraine's fall from 47th place in 2022 to 57th in 2023 in the Anholt-Ipsos Nation Brands Index — with a stable score of its own while other countries improved their rankings — is a signal of a deterioration in Ukraine's relative position in that index. On its own, it does not prove the existence of "Ukraine fatigue" — that remains a possible trend and a subject requiring further observation, not a confirmed fact. It is also the most recent publicly available result for Ukraine in this ranking, and the one used in this report.

The absence of a single overarching brand-coordination body

Communication of Ukraine's international image is today spread across state institutions, UkraineInvest, the Brand Ukraine initiative, regional authorities and numerous civic organisations and initiatives. This does not mean an absence of branding efforts, but it does make it harder to maintain a single, long-term and consistent message.

Western media and the war frame

Positive stories about Ukraine — including on IT, agriculture, culture or Diia — are often presented in Western media in the context of the war as well. This can make it harder to build associations that are entirely independent of the conflict, even when the news itself concerns other areas.

Where things stand

Contemporary Ukraine

Tradition meets modernity

Tradition and modernity are not opposites in Ukraine — they increasingly coexist. Contemporary Ukrainian cuisine (borscht, varenyky, traditional baking) is developing alongside the new wave of gastronomy that the wartime diaspora is building in European capitals. Traditional crafts — Petrykivka painting, inscribed in 2013 on UNESCO's Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, Opishnya ceramics, embroidery — are meeting modern design and e-commerce, reaching new audiences without losing their roots. A strong engineering education dating back to the Soviet era is today feeding into modern AI, cybersecurity and defence technology — sectors in which Ukraine is moving from pure outsourcing towards its own, recognisable product brands.

This combination — of craft and the digital economy, of cuisine and design, of traditional technical education and modern engineering — is one of the strongest, and least used, threads in Ukraine's brand: it shows a country that does not have to choose between its past and its future.

The people of contemporary Ukraine

The categories of people who can show the world a Ukraine that goes beyond the war are not limited to a single field — and the choice of brand ambassadors should not be a ranking or a list of "the best":

• Entrepreneurs and technology builders — people building export-oriented companies and products in IT, defence technology and related sectors, moving beyond the pure-outsourcing model.
• Scientists and engineers — including the people behind Diia's solutions, as well as engineers working on drone and defence technologies.
• Cultural figures — musicians, artists, directors and writers building Ukraine's recognition outside the context of the war; a well-documented example of global reach is the country's three Eurovision wins (Ruslana, 2004; Jamala, 2016; Kalush Orchestra, 2022).
• Athletes — globally recognised names long associated with Ukraine, such as the Klitschko brothers and Oleksandr Usyk.
• The diaspora — millions of Ukrainians abroad as an informal network of brand ambassadors and potential returning investors.

Ambassador selection should favour people who have achieved genuine international success in fields not directly linked to the war, so as to build associations independent of the conflict. A deliberate exception on this list is politicians — barring rare, cross-party symbols — because a credible brand should be independent of the current political cycle.

Reconstruction — the scale of the challenge

The scale of Ukraine's planned reconstruction is, by itself, already a major economic event on a global scale. The fifth joint Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5), published on 23 February 2026 by the Government of Ukraine, the World Bank Group, the European Commission and the United Nations, estimated the country's ten-year reconstruction and recovery needs at close to $588 billion, based on damage and needs as of 31 December 2025.

Since 2022, an annual cycle of Ukraine Recovery Conferences (URC) has taken place: Lugano (2022), London (2023), Berlin (2024), Rome (2025). URC 2026 was held on 25–26 June 2026 in Gdańsk, co-organised by Poland and Ukraine — making Poland a direct institutional partner in Ukraine's reconstruction, not merely a neighbour watching from the sidelines.

What Ukraine can learn from other countries

• Israel — "Start-up Nation"

  Israel has built a strong international reputation in technology and innovation, even though security issues and conflict remain a significant part of its global image. In April 2022, President Volodymyr Zelensky referenced Israel's security experience as one point of reference for postwar Ukraine. For Ukraine, the most useful observation here is that technological recognition can coexist with persistent geopolitical risk — though this is not a simple model to copy.

• South Korea — the "Miracle on the Han River"

  After the devastation of the Korean War (1950–1953), South Korea underwent a decades-long economic transformation and built a strong international position in fields such as electronics, automotive manufacturing and popular culture. That process took one to two generations of consistent industrial strategy, and unfolded under historical and geopolitical conditions entirely different from Ukraine's current situation — it is an example of long-term transformation, not a ready-made model to replicate.

• Rwanda — an attempt to build a new image after genocide

  After the 1994 genocide, Rwanda pursued an active policy of building a new international image, centred among other things on security, tourism, conferences and digitalisation. This example shows that a state can try to build new associations after an experience of mass violence, but it also calls for caution: a country's reputation depends not only on communication strategy but also on the quality of its institutions, human rights, domestic politics and real economic performance.

• Estonia — "e-Estonia"

  A small post-Soviet country built a globally recognised brand around digitalising public administration — the most direct analogy to Ukraine's Diia: a narrow but very concrete technological edge, well promoted, can define an entire country's brand.

• Poland — the experience of EU accession

  Poland went through the full process of European integration and the transformation from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. Its experience can be a useful reference point when analysing institutional reform, integration into the EU market and the building of economic credibility — while bearing in mind that Poland's and Ukraine's historical and geopolitical conditions are different.

What comes next

For the public sector

It would be worth establishing or strengthening a single institution responsible for a coherent postwar national brand; actively promoting Diia as an export product, not only a domestic tool; and preparing a "day after" communication strategy — a ready reconstruction narrative — before the conflict ends.

For business

It would be worth using the global recognition of the name "Ukraine" to build sector brands (IT, agri-tech, defence-tech) independent of the war context, and investing in storytelling built on real case studies of success rather than appeals for help alone.

For society and the diaspora

It would be worth mobilising the diaspora as a network of brand ambassadors abroad, and building a narrative of pride and future alongside — not instead of — the legitimate narrative of sacrifice and loss.

Five things worth remembering

1. Visibility without full control. Ukraine today has unprecedented global visibility, but limited control over what that visibility is associated with.
2. The risk of a "victim country" brand. Overreliance on a narrative of suffering risks entrenching sympathy rather than admiration and a desire to invest.
3. Real, underused advantages. Diia, the IT sector, defence technology and agriculture are proven advantages, not theoretical ones.
4. Signs of Ukraine fatigue. The fall in the Nation Brands Index between 2022 and 2023 — the most recent publicly available result used in this report — is a signal that the window of global attention may be narrowing, not the definitive proof of that phenomenon.
5. No single overarching coordination body. Fragmented institutional communication may make it harder to maintain a consistent, long-term message about Ukraine.

Sources and methodology Show sources Hide sources

• Government of Ukraine, World Bank Group, European Commission, United Nations — fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5), 23.02.2026.
• Council of the European Union — opening of the "Fundamentals" negotiating cluster in Ukraine's EU accession process, 15.06.2026. (consilium.europa.eu)
• Ukraine Recovery Conference — conference archive, urc-international.com; URC 2026 co-organised by Poland, Gdańsk, 25–26.06.2026.
• European Council (23.06.2022) — decision granting Ukraine EU candidate status. (consilium.europa.eu)
• Ipsos — Anholt-Ipsos Nation Brands Index 2023. (ipsos.com)
• IT Ukraine Association (itukraine.org.ua) / National Bank of Ukraine — data on IT and computer-services exports, 2025 and H1 2026.
• UkraineInvest (ukraineinvest.gov.ua), 03.02.2023 — "Record IT exports in 2022 brought the Ukrainian economy $7.3 billion."
• Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine — data on Diia, 2026.
• Ministry of Defence of Ukraine — drone production and procurement, 2022–2026.
• FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) — Ukraine's share of world agricultural exports, 2024. (fao.org)
• UN OHCHR (ohchr.org) — casualties of the conflict in Donbas, 14.04.2014–31.12.2021.
• UNESCO (unesco.org) — inscription of Petrykivka painting on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, 2013.
• Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine / Red Dot Design Award (red-dot.org) — the "Ukraine NOW" brand, 2018.
• Al Jazeera (05.04.2022); Atlantic Council — statements by President Zelensky.
• UNHCR (unhcr.org) — Ukraine refugee situation.
• Holodomor Museum / HREC / Britannica — Holodomor victim estimates.
• Anholt, S.; Olins, W. — theoretical framework for nation branding.

Figures in this area change quickly — verifying the currency of the statistics is recommended before any external use.